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In this paper, the problem of evaluating a new ecologically
damaging project undertaken by a locally dominant firm is studied. Often
the total cost of undertaking such a project tends to be under evaluated for
several reasons. One major reason is due to the failure to anticipate the rise
of several small fringe firms in different regions and the impact of
competition with them. This paper uses recent advances in game theory to
present a game theoretic model to evaluate such a project in the context of
what happened in Nepal when Arun project was mulled by the Nepal
Electricity Authority in 1990s.
The firm that undertakes the project in our model is a big firm that
produces and distributes power. Several reasons restrict it from acting as a
monopolist: one is the presence of several fringe firms. Fringe firms also
compete for available labor besides competing for market. We assume in
this model that bringing skilled labor from foreign countries is prohibitive.
Fringe firms produce power using backward technology. Though
generally in Nepal it is observed that firms controlled mainly by local
investors often capture a tiny market where the investors live because the
NEA leaves the market to the fringe firm, we don’t capture that scenario
here because we care about the market where competition takes place or is
likely. We also follow the usual assumption of presence of Walrasian
auctioneer in each region where price of electricity is determined by the
total quantity and a noise component. Noise component is added so that
neither NEA nor the fringe firms can infer the exact amount of power
produced by the competitor. What they observe is price and history of the
price, and decide how much to produce (or in the case of NEA, how much
to market in a particular region where it competes with the fringe firm) in
the next period. Let f(p,q) be the probability density function of price.
Let Ω be the support of price in each region, which we assume to be same
for all regions. We assume that there is no atom in the support. We
partition the marketing regions into N-1 parts, and assume the presence of
one fringe firm in each part. This reflects the actual situation in the ground
only partially, since in Nepal, most of the electricity market is captured by
NEA exclusively. However, areas where there are fringe firms often have
only one firm producing electricity in a region. Hence this problem can be
simplified by assuming that there are N-1 markets where NEA plays
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duopoly Nash game with fringe firms. The value of the project for NEA is
the net present value of expected payoff of undertaking the project and
then selling it in a region where the market is shared by another firm
(fringe firm) multiplied by N-1. Difficulty in modeling this problem is
evident immediately: first we need to know the cost of producing the
power, and then we must allow for the payoff matrix for continuous
actions taken in continuous time. This will give us, for a reasonable guess
for Von Neumann Morgenstein utility function for NEA (for example, one
can use the profit equals utility for this utility function), a fairly good idea
of what the net present value of undertaking the project is. However, as
Abreau, Pierce and Staccheti(1990) and Fudenberg, Eric and
Maskin(1994) show (consistent with Nash Folk theorems), the value set
estimated could be fairly large set. In fact, any smooth subset of V, where
V is the compact set of value functions, could be achieved in equilibrium
for sufficiently patient players. With this theoretical foundation, we try to
look at the derivation of such equilibrium value set, and interpret it as a
tool that could be used in predicting a true value of a project such as Arun.
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